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IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
X I Cl\: l\L VRONTIKIS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
DOROTHY l\I1\l~ JENSON 
\~1\()XTIKIS, 
Defendant and Appella~nt. 
Case 
No. 9252 
BRIEF O·F AP·PELLAN'T 
ST1~TE~IENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this brief the parties will be re-
ferred to hy their designation in the trial court. Plaintiff 
and defendant first met in Fort Worth, Texas, in 1946, 
and were married at Elko, Nevada on the 30th day of 
October, 1952. (R. 145, 146). The marriage had as a 
foundation an '~antenuptial" agreement, executed be-
t"Teen the parties on the day of the marriage, wherein 
the plaintiff agreed to pay the defendant in event of 
diYorce, $250.00 if he 'Yere plaintiff, and $1,000.00 if he 
'vere defendant. (R. 29-33). The lower court held the 
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contract null and void as far as the divorce proceeding 
is concerned, it being a "contract for a divorce" at the 
pleasure of the plaintiff. (R. 64). The antenuptial 
agreement is not an issue before this Court, except as 
to the claim by the defendant that it was used to upset 
and coerce the defendant through threats of the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff filed his action for divorce on January 23, 
1959, (R. 1) and his amended action on March 11, 1959 
(R. 20). Defendant anS\\~ered and counterclaimed on 
February 10, 1959 (R. 4), and amended the same on 
~larch 23, 1959 (R. 34). Trial was held on October 22, 
1959 (R. 135), following hospitalizations of the defend-
ant for physical and mental illnesses. (R. 260.) 
Plaintiff testified that the defendant cursed and 
swore at him during the two years preceding the action 
(R. 172); that they had sexual intercourse on two occa-
sions during 1958 (R. 17 4); that defendant would not 
let plaintiff have sexual intercourse (R. 17 4) ; that the 
times \Yhen they did haYe intercourse was when the 
plaintiff thought they were going to have a reconcilia-
tion. (R. 174.) 
Plaintiff testified that in l\Iay 1958 he and defendant 
had discussed adopting children, and that the defendant 
refused, and did not r hangc her mind thereafter; ( R. 156-
160) that defendant refused to visit plaintiff's parents 
and brother, or invite them to her home. (R. 148-150.) 
Defendant denied that she S\\'"Ore or cursed the 
plaintiff (R. 258-259); or that she had refused to have 
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sexual intercourse "·ith him (R. 258); or refused to have 
children ( J~. 258) ; or that she had referred to the parents 
or brother of the plaintiff in vulgar or obscene language 
(R. ~:>D). Defendant testified that the plaintiff's habits 
of arrival and departure resulted in his coming home at 
4:00 o'clock in the morning, which he did for several 
months, 'vithout accounting for his absence. (R. 262-
263); that during a discussion regarding the antenuptial 
agreement, plaintiff threatened to throw defendant out 
of the house if she did not do what he told her ( R. 265) ; 
that she wanted to adopt children about two years after 
the marriage, but plaintiff treated her like a doormat. 
(R. 279.) 
Plaintiff's annual income for the years 1956, 1957 
and 1958 'vas $8,185.56, $11,510.57, and $7,620.03, re-
spectively. (R. 212). Property acquired by the parties 
includes an equity in real estate in the sum of $9,500.00 
(R. 287); corporate stock of Vrontikis Bros., Inc., with 
a par value of $10,000 (R. 181) ; a note receivable in the 
sum of $10,000 (R. 186); household furnishings and 
appliances (R. 227); Gunsite Butte Uranium Corporation 
stock valued at $1,080, which the lower court found not 
to be property of the plaintiff, although held in his name. 
(R. 183-.t; R. 121.) 
Of this property and income defendant was awarded 
$3,000 as her share of the property, $150 per month 
alimony and support money for one year, household 
appliances, attorney fees, and costs. (R. 126). Plain-
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tiff was a'varded the remainder of the property, and 
the divorce. (R. 126.) 
Defendant appeals from the property award as 
being inequitable and unjust, and from the lower court's 
refusal to make such amendment in its findings, con-
clusions and decree. The defendant also claims revers-
ible error in excluding evidence at the trial material to 
her defense and counterclaim, and for the trial court's 
refusal to grant a new trial on that basis. 
Reversible error is also claimed in denying to the 
defendant discovery rights. The defendant further sub-
mits that plaintiff failed to establish that he had the 
necessary residence requirements to obtain a divorce. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
REVERSIBLE ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN EX-
CLUDING EVIDENCE MATERIAL TO THE PROSE-
CUTION OF DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM AND 
DEFENSE. 
POINT II. 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN SUS-
TAINING PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO DEFEND-
ANT'S INTERROGATORIES OF MAY 21, 1959. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING 
THAT PLAINTIFF HAD THE REQUISITE RESIDENCE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COURT TO AWARD HIM 
A DIVORCE. 
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POINT IV. 
THE PROPERTY AWARD IS INEQUITABLE AND UN-
JUST TO THE DEFENDANT, AND SHOULD BE 
MODIFIED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
REVERSIBLE ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN EX-
CLUDING EVIDENCE MATERIAL TO THE PROSE-
CUTION OF DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM AND 
DEFENSE. 
The lower court committed reversible error 1n ex-
cluding testimony offered by the defendant (1) bearing 
upon plaintiff's conduct prior to the filing of plaintiff's 
amended complaint and defendant's counterclaim; and 
(2) bearing upon plaintiff's action in using the ante-
nuptial agreement in such a way as to inflict mental 
suffering on the defendant. 
(1) Defendant called plaintiff as a witness at the 
trial and attempted to examine him regarding his con-
duct prior to the date defendant filed her counterclaim, 
and also prior to the date of the filing of the Amended 
Complaint by the plaintiff. The trial proceeding follo,Ys: 
''BY ~IR. GEE: 
Q. l\Ir. \T rontikis, during the first of Febru-
ary, 1959, you '\Yent to Mexico. 
~IR. P .I\ lTI_j (~OTRO-l\IANES: Your Honor, 
'\Ye object to it, it is immaterial. The date of 
filing the complaint 'vas January 1959, what he 
did subsequent i~ not a matter before the court. 
5 
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MR. GEE: I would argue that, first, it was 
before the amended complaint was filed; second, 
it was before the defendant's counterclaim was 
filed. 
MR. PAUL COTRO-MANES: The commence-
ment of this action is the date of the filing of 
the action. 
(Argument by counsel) 
THE COURT: What do you claim for this, 
Mr. Gee~ Are you going to show some infidelity 
or question of infidelity, is that your purpose? 
MR. GEE: I want to ask the defendant his 
where abouts. 
MR. N. J. COTRO-MANES: Is that your 
purpose1 
MR. GEE : Your Honor, I have-
THE COURT: I have asked you the question. 
You can answer me. 
MR. GEE : Yes, Your Honor, I ''Tould ask and 
I want to know ""'hether he "'"as stepping out on 
his wife or not. 
THE COURT: Since the filing of the com-
plaint~ 
MR. GEE : Yes, I asked him J·esterday. 
THE COURT: I think the ruling "'"ill be the 
same. The objection 'viii be sustained.'' 
(R. 284-285) 
See also R. 210-211. 
It is clear that the objection of the plaintiff is 
specific and based upon the premise that any action of 
the plaintiff after the filing of his complaint is imma-
terial. The Court sustained the objection after specific-
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ally asking if thP inquired of conduct was after the 
complaint \Yas filed. 
''It is a rule of universal application that an objec-
tion is deemed to be limited to the ground or grounds 
Rpeeificd and does not cover others not specified. Where 
specifir grounds are stated the implication is that there 
are no others, or, if others, that they are waived.'' 88 
C.J.C., Trial, ~125b; --.Jtherley v. MacDonald, Young and 
.Vel son, Inc., (Calif.) 298 P. 2d 700; Godding v. Swanso11, 
(Pa.) 98 A. 2d 210; Spe·ncer, et al., v. Burns, et al., (Ill.) 
108 N.E. 2d 413; Se·1urr a:nd Waterworks Improvement 
Dist. No. 1 v. Mr0leudon., (Ark.) 60 S.W. 2d 920. 
All other grounds for objection having been waived, 
1s the sole basis for objection by plaintiff, and the 
Court's sole reason for sustaining the objection, sound 
in la\Y? Ample authority supports the principle that a 
cause of action of a defendant in a divorce action may 
be based upon facts occurring after the institution of 
the plaintiff's action, but prior to the filing of a coun-
terclaim. 
In the 1952 case of Cameron v. Cameron (N.C.), 68 
S.E. 2d 796, the rule is stated as follows: 
''It is well settled that in an action for divorce, 
either absolute or from bed and board, it is per-
missible for the defendant to set up a cause of 
action for diYorce, either absolute or from bed 
and board, as a counterclaim or cross demand. 
* * * Such countl.•rrlaim or cross demand may 
even be based, in \Yhole or in part, upon facts 
occurring after the institution of the action. * * * 
(citing cases.)" 
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The rationale underlying this rule is that the defendant 
could make her cause of action the subject matter of an 
independent suit, which suit would be separate and dis-
tinct from any claim of the plaintiff, and certainly not 
negated or controlled if or when the plaintiff files an 
action. The action of the defendant, as embraced in a 
counterclaim, asks independent relief and the Court 
should act upon it separately and apart from the plain-
tiff's action. Pettigrew v. Pettigrew (Ark.), 291 S.W. 90. 
That appellant's action as embraced in a counter-
claim may be based upon facts occurring after the insti-
tution of the suit by plaintiff and prior to the filing of 
the counterclaim is supported further by the following 
cases: Roberts v. Roberts (\V. Va.), 128 S.E. 144; .J!ar-
tin v. Martin, 33 W. Va. 695, 11 S.E. 12; Neddo v. Neddo, 
56 Kan. 507, 44 P. 1; Heinemann v. Heinernann (Wise.), 
233 N.W. 552; VonBernuth r. TT onBernutlz (N.J.), 74 A. 
700; Ames v. A1nes, 178 N.Y.S. 177; Weiss v. Weiss, 238 
N.Y.S. 36 . 
... 4ll of tlzi.s is not to lose siglzt of the fact that the 
inquired of co·nduct occurred before the filing of plain-
tiff's an~ended cOHlpla·int, 1l'hich zue subnrit is the date 
of the institution of plaintiff's action. 
Lest plaintiff no"'" offer some other basis for his 
objPetion, \Ye inYite this ('1ourt 's attention to the general 
rule that ''if evidence is erroneously excluded on a 
certain ground, the ruling \Yill not be sustained because 
the evidence might haYe been inadmissible on another 
ground, although such other grounds haYe been assigned 
by counsel objecting to the admission of the eYidence 
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(not thP ease here!) but not adopted by the court as 
t hl' basis for its decision." 4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, 
p. 8D-l-: See HuntsJJlan v. Hunfs1nan (Utah), 192 P. 368; 
R.l!a1s 'l'. JJ'"ilson (Ga.), 111 S.E. 414; Bloodgood v. Lynch, 
et al. (X. y·.), 56 N.E. 2d 718; Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. 
v. Ilu,qhes (Okla.), 166 P. 411. The rationale behind the 
rule is that the objection must inform the court the point 
being argued by the objector and inform the opposite 
party the point of the objection so that he may have an 
opportunity to obviate the error if possible. Such we 
submit is the underlying rule of the H111ntsman decision 
~upra, \Yherein this Court refused to uphold a sustaining 
of an objection on grounds other than those specified, 
\Yhich \Yere 'vithout merit, on the premise that the oppo-
site party to the objector was "thrown off guard" by 
the lo\Yer court's action in erroneously sustaining on the 
specific ground. 
The lower court committed reversible error In ex-
cluding the aforementioned evidence, and in denying 
defendant's motion for a new trial. That the error is 
prejudicial is apparent. Can justice and equity be done 
by the defendant if the foregoing evidence sought to be 
introduced is not \Yeighed in considering defendant's 
grounds for divorce? Or weighed in corroboration of 
defendant's testimony regarding plaintiff's habits of 
arrival and departure ? The evidence also challenges 
plaintiff's standing to ask for equitable relief; it bears 
directly on the questionable cleanliness of plaintiff's 
hands as he stands before the Court. Is it not prejudicial 
to deny defendant the opportunity to refute the "fault-
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less'' claim of plaintiff, whether as a defense or separate 
claim 1 
The excluded evidence also bears upon the credibility 
of plaintiff, who denied any infidelity. (R. 209-210). 
Furthermore, plaintiff claimed he suffered certain dis-
tress as a result of defendant's acts, which claim would 
have questionable foundation if the evidence sought to 
be introduced had not been excluded. We submit that as 
long as this Court considers relative fault as a factor in 
granting a divorce and awarding property to the parties, 
it should receive and weigh the evidence which was here 
excluded to the prejudice of the defendant. 
(2) The Court denied the admission in evidence of 
a letter from an attorney purportedly representing the 
plaintiff, addressed to and received by the plaintiff, in 
late 1956 and alleging defendant's non-compliance with 
the terms of an antenuptial agreement, (R. 29) which 
allegation \vas groundless, as the agreement itself "Till 
show and caused the defendant to suffer mental distress. 
(R. 265). The letter so submitted would have further 
corroborated the claims of defendant that the agreement 
\vas the basis of threats, argument and discord. 
The Court denied receipt of the Exhibit on the 
ground of hearsay : 
'' 1\IR. GEE: 1:"" our Honor, I would like to 
submit this in evidence. 
MR. N. J. COTRO-~IANES: \Y. e object, Your 
Honor please, on the ground - I \vould like to 
ask her one question before I make my objection 
on the instrument. 
10 
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THE COURT: Isn't it hearsay~ This is not 
from the defendant, is it~ 
l\IR. GEE: It is a party representing to be 
attorney of the defendant. (sic) 
THE COURT: It would still be hearsay, 
wouldn't it~~ It would be hearsay if it was from 
the plaintiff himself unless you brought it in in 
the admission against interest rule. You can't 
avoid the hearsay rule by submitting written 
communication through an agent. 
MR. GEE: l\Iay we withhold the submission 
at this time~ 
THE COURT: All right, or you may reoffer 
it. It is denied at this time." (R. 256.) 
In an attempt to show the agency relationship, and 
that the Exhibit was sent at the request and instance of 
plaintiff, and with malice, and that the antenuptial agree-
ment \Yas used by plaintiff as an instrument of coercion 
and duress, since by its terms the defendant would be 
left virtually penniless in event of divorce, plaintiff was 
asked the following by counsel for defendant: 
"Q. Who was your attorney in the fall of 
1956°? 
:\IR. ~- J. COTRO-MANES: Just a minute, 
object to that, it is incompetent, irrelevant and 
immaterial and not within the issues of this case. 
l\IR. GEE: It is preliminary, Your Honor. 
~[R. N. J. COTRO-MANES: I don't see the 
materiality. 
l\IR. GEE : I will get to it. 
l\IR .. N. J. COTRO-MANES: State the pur-
pose \Yhy you ask the question. 
THE COURT: Why. 
11 
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MR. GEE: It falls in the making of the ante-
nuptial agreement, the attorney wrote letters to 
my client for her failure to abide with the terms 
of the antenuptial agreement. It is for the pur-
pose of showing this lever that was used by the 
plaintiff. 
THE COURT: To do ,,,.hat? 
MR. GEE: To force his will, or obtain his 
\vay with the defendant. 
THE COURT: How \\"Ould asking who IS 
attorney show that~ 
You don't have the attorney available, you 
\vould be stuck with his answer any\\Tay, wouldn't 
you, whether he says he uses force or not. 
MR. GEE: It is to ascertain whether upon 
his instigation or his attorney's and "Tith his 
knowledge, his attorney contacted the defendant 
and told the defendant she \Yas not abiding by 
the terms of the antenuptial agreement. 
THE COURT: I think the objection should 
be sustained.'' (R. 290-291.) 
In Brookins 1). Brookin.s (Iowa), 300 N.W. 540, the 
court in admitting a letter from the secretary of the 
defendant to the defendant, although never received by 
him, held: 
''The general rule is stated in 20 .. A_m. J ur. 
807, thus : 'Generally, correspondence of persons 
\vhere offered as cYidence of the facts stated 
therein must be excluded under the general prin-
ciple respecting res inter alios acta, unless the 
party against ",.hom the communications are ten-
dered is in some \Yay connected there\Yith or knew 
and approved their utterance. Letters of third 
12 
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pPr~ons art~ rect·ivable in evidence, however, when 
tlll~y n rl~ merely collateral, introductory, or inci-
dental to, or in illustration of, the testimony 
''Thich the "·it11ess gives, or are receivable to 
l~stablish \vhat one's intention was or where he 
\\'as at a given time.' Here defendant was con-
nected ,,·ith the letters. They were addressed to 
him. They corroborated other evidence of his 
relations \vith his secretary. They tended to con-
firm plaintiff's suspicions. The statements of 
fact contained in them were obviously hearsay. 
In au action tried to a jury, their admissibility 
\vould be very doubtful. But, in an action in 
equity, tried to the court, \vith their weight as 
evidence limited by full appreciation of the nar-
ro\v limits \vithin \vhich they might be considered, 
\Ye think that the objection to their admission in 
evidence is not well taken.'' 
In the case before this Court, the defendant at-
tempted to not only prove an agency relationship through 
admissions of the principal, but that the principal, Nick 
\: rontikis, had his attorney contact the defendant re-
garding alleged conduct that had no foundation in fact; 
that the action of the plaintiff in this regard, in light of 
the mental and emotional state of the defendant was 
malicious and an act of extreme cruelty. In sustaining 
the objection to the preliminary question set forth above, 
the Court stated: "You don't have the attorney avail-
able, you \Vould be stuck \vith his answer any\vay, 
\vouldn 't you, \vhether he says he uses foree or not.'' 
(R. 291.) 
By what rule of law is a party precluded from asking 
a question because he is go1ng to be stuck \vith the 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
answer~ Can not this be said about all questions, and of 
all witnesses~ The Court apparently considered the 
question one of trial technique, rather than one of the 
rules and princi pies governing evidence. 
In the case of Whitaker r. Keogh (Neb.), 14 N.W. 2d 
596, the court held: 
''The plaintiff complains of the ruling of the 
trial court in excluding a statement made by the 
chauffeur of defendant's car immediately after 
the collision. Plaintiff offered to show that the 
chauffeur said: 'Lady, I am sorry. I just saw 
you the instant I collided with you.' We think 
the evidence was properly receivable as an admis-
sion against interest. \\:''"hatever an agent or 
employee does in the la,yful exercise of his au-
thorty is imputable to the principal, and "There 
the acts of an agent or employee will bind the 
principal, his representations, declarations and 
admissions respecting the subject matter will also 
bind him, if made at the same time and constitute 
a part of the same transaction. Wigmore, EYi-
dence, sec. 1078. The question is one of substan-
tive la,Y, the law of agency. It is not a question 
of res gestae as is often supposed. \\igmore, 
E "d 1-o- '' VI ence, sec. '~''. 
See alf;;o 1lfyrick v. Lloyd (Fla.), 27 So. 2d 615. 
In vie"'" of the foregoing authority and reasoning, 
we submit that the trial court committed reversible error 
in excluding the evidence aforementioned, and not grant-
ing defendant's motion for a ne",. trial. 
Evidence of the effect of the antenuptial agreement, 
and the use madP by the plaintiff thereof, should have 
14 
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l>t~en recei \·Pd by the court, in its consideration of the 
claim and defense of the defendant. The excluded evi-
dence ( 1) borP directly on defendant's grounds for 
divoree; (~) would have corroborated defendant's testi-
mony as to plaintiff's use of the agreement to coerce 
her~ (3) was material in considering plaintiff's standing 
for Pquitable relief; ( 4) should have been weighed in 
any property a"\vard \vhere relative fault was a factor 
in determining the award. 
POINT II. 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN SUS-
TAINING PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO DEFEND-
ANT'S INTERROGATORIES OF MAY 21, 1959. 
On _J{ay ~1, 1959, defendant submitted to the plain-
tiff interrogatories under the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure (R. 59). Plaintiff objected to numbers 2, 4, 5 
and 6 thereof (R. 61), and the Court sustained the objec-
tion (R. 65). The action of the Court is prejudicial error. 
Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
in part: 
''Any party may serve upon any adverse party 
\vritten interrogatories to be answered by the 
party served or, if the party served is a public 
or private corporation or a partnership or asso-
ciation, by any officer or agent, who shall furnish 
such information as 1s available to the party. 
* * *" 
"Interrogatories may relate to any matters 
\vhich can be inquired into under Rule 26 (b), and 
15 
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the ans\\.,.ers may be used to the same extent as 
provided in Rule 26(d) for the use of the depo-
sition of a party. * * * '' 
Rule 26 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, pro-
vides: 
''Unless otherwise ordered by the court as 
provided by Rule 30(b) or (d), the deponent may 
be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, 
which is relevant to the subject matter involved 
in the pending action, whether it relates to the 
claim or defense of the examining party, or to 
the claim or defense of any other party, including 
the existence, description, nature, custody, con-
dition and location of any books, documents, or 
other tangible things and the identity and loca-
tion of persons having knowledge of relevant 
facts. It is not ground for objection that the 
testimony "\Yill be inadmissible at the trial if the 
testimony sought appears reasonably calculated 
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.'' 
Question 2 under the interrogatories is typical of 
the information sought, and reads as follows : 
'' 2. What "\Yas the net worth of V rontikis 
Bros., Inc. at the conclusion of the years 1956, 
1957 and 1958'? What is the present net worth and 
book value of Vrontikis Bros., Inc. 1 '' 
Sinee the plaintiff is a stockholder in \Trontikis 
Bros., Inc., the question "\Yas relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the action, and "\Yas calculated to lead 
to the discover~T of admissible evidence. The net w·orth 
and hook value of the corporation are essential infor-
16 
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mat ion in a~ecrtaining the value of plaintiff's stock in 
the corpora ti< )n. 
rrhe deft}lldant, denied this discovery right, \VaS at 
tl1P mercy of plaintiff at trial, who in his dual role of 
husband and corporate president gave testimony adverse 
to the defendant on the subject of corporate income and 
\\·orth (R. 190); yet defendant "\vas denied the same in-
formation prior to trial. 
The lower court provided a ''haven'' for plaintiff 
111 sustaining his objections to defendant's interroga-
tories of ~[a~~ 21, 1959, although the information sought 
w'as material and relevant. Certainly this action was 
prejudicial to defendant and is ground for reversal. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING 
THAT PLAINTIFF HAD THE REQUISITE RESIDENCE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COURT TO AWARD HIM 
A DIVORCE. 
The defendant did not challenge the allegation of 
the plaintiff that he was an aetual and bona fide resident 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and had been for 
more than three months prior to the commencement of 
the action. X cYertheless, such residence requirement is 
required by statute and is jurisdictional. See Section 
30-3-1, U.C .. A .. 1953, as amended; ltT eiss r. Weiss (Utah), 
179 P. 2d 1005; .i\nnotation, Length of Domicil as a 
Jurisdictional j[atter in Divorce Action, subparagraph 
Question ..:\rising Upon .A.ppeal, and rases cited therein, 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 A.I.J.R. 2d 301. Furthermore, the Court must make a 
finding as to residence based upon evidence. See Sec-
tion 30-3-4, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
The record fails to sho\Y evidence supporting the 
finding that plaintiff was a resident of Salt Lake County 
for the three months prior to the filing of the action. 
The lower court, therefore, had no jurisdiction to grant 
plaintiff a divorce; and in any event committed error 
in awarding a divorce to the plaintiff ''"·hen the evidence 
did not bear out his residency as required by the Utah 
law. 
POINT IV. 
THE PROPERTY AWARD IS INEQUITABLE AND UN-
JUST TO THE DEFENDANT, AND SHOULD BE 
110DIFIED. 
The property diYision award of the lower court "·as 
unfair and unjust in denying to the defendant an equit-
able distribution of the property owned by the parties. 
This Court has heretofore considered one-third of the 
property as being a fair proportion to be a\Yarded to 
the wife \\·hen a divorce decree is a".,.arded the husband. 
Woolley v. TTT oolley. 113 Utah 391, 195 P. 2d 7 43. Granted 
that this must Yary \Yith the facts of a particular case, 
three Plements present in this instance justify an award 
P\.PJl in excess of the one-third rule set forth in the 
Woolley derision. These elements are (1) the financial 
condition and neressities of the defendant: (2) her 
ability and opportunity to earn money, and (3) the health 
18 
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of the defendant, all of \vhich are to be considered by 
the ( \n1rt in making a property distribution. Pinion v. 
l'iuiou, 9:2 l~tnh 255, 67 P. 2d 265. 
The defendant was not employed, had no separate 
property or estate (R. 262), had suffered recent physical 
and mental illness (R. 69, R. 260), and by virtue of her 
mental condition "l'ill be limited in her future employ-
ment. ( R. 122). The finding by the Court in relation to 
the health of the defendant follows: 
'' 15. The court observes and finds that the 
defendant is competent to handle her ordinary 
affairs; that she has apparently suffered serious 
mental illness and by reason of the same she must 
still be restricted and controlled in her activities ; 
that a continuance of those stresses which had 
previously been a danger to her condition would 
limit her future employment; that her continued 
mental health will require continued control and 
restriction of activity.'' (R. 122.) 
This Court is requested to take judicial notice of the 
rase, "In the l\Iatter of the Mental Condition of Dorothy 
J[ae Vrontikis,'' No. 8533, Third Judicial District, and 
findings therein. 
The lower court had before it the following property 
for distribution: 
(1) A residence, the equity of which was $9500. (R. 
121.) 
(2) A note in the amount of $10,000 due and owing 
in favor of the plaintiff (R. 121); no evidence \vas intro-
19 
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duced to show the payor, Vrontikis Bros., Inc., could not 
pay the obligation. 
(3) Household furnishings and appliances. (R. 
121.) 
( 4) 10,000 shares of stock of V rontikis Bros., Inc., 
par value of $1.00 per share. (R. 181). 
The court erroneously valued this stock at $1,000, 
upon plaintiff's testimony that its value "may be ten 
cents'' a share. (R. 217). In ans·w·er to the question of 
whether the plaintiff had a balance sheet before him 
\vhen he determined the book value as ten cents, plaintiff 
answered ''No.'' (R. 217). In answer to the query of 
what he did have before him, and over the objection, but 
"~ith the final assistance, of counsel, plaintiff said: "I 
don't know." (R. 217). No competent testimony of the 
plaintiff supports the finding of the court that the 
10,000 shares of stock of Vrontikis Bros., Inc. is worth 
$1,000. The court did err in so finding. 
The court committed further error 111 not finding 
that the 10,000 shares of stock in question are worth the 
par Ynlue of $10,000. In the abst>nce of any other eYi-
dence of Yalue, the par Yalue of the stork is presump-
tively the value of the stork. 
According to Tcris 1'. Ryan (..A.riz.), 108 P. 461, 
affirmed 233 1T.S. ~73: 
" * * * Tl r T • t t f d t · · 1e e are 'nr1ous c·s s or e ermnung 
the value of stork in a corporation. In the absence 
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of auy other eYidence of value, the par value is 
presumpti \?ely the value of the stock. * * *" 
d The par value of a share of stock in a corporation 
1s prima facie its actual value.'' Walker v. Bement, 
(Inu.) 94 N.E. 339. See also Brinkerhoff-Farris Trust 
a ud Sarings Co. u. Home Lumber Co., (Mo.) 24 S.W. 
1~9 ~ Tr illiaJJls u. E rerPtf, (Mo.) 200 S.W. 1045. 
rrhat par Yalue is prima facie the actual Value Of 
stock is especially apparent in a jurisdiction such as 
lTtah "?here the "true value" rule prevails. Union Pa-
cifi.c R. Co. r. Blair, et al., 48 Utah 38, 156 P. 948; Tintic 
Indian Chief Min. & ill ill. Co. v. Clyde, 79 Utah 337, 10 
P. ~d 932. Under the foregoing authority it is apparent 
that a subscriber will be given credit for only the actual 
Yalue of property given in payment of his subscription . 
..:\rticle XII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
"Corporations shall not issue stock, * * * ex-
cept for money or property received, or labor 
done. * * * '' 
See also Section 16-2-7, U. C.A. 1953. 
Since the true value rule prevails in this jurisdiction 
there can be no question that stock with par value, if 
is~ned, must be in exchange for property or money, the 
actual Yalue of 'vhich, equals or exceeds the par value . 
.. A .. nd in the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, 
the par value of stock is prima facie its actual value. 
In the instant case there IS no showing by competent 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
evidence that the stock in question had value other than 
the par Yalue; the par value then must be prima facie 
the actual value. 
This conclusion is supported further by the evidence 
that the corporation paid "bonuses" to the plaintiff 
during the years 1956, 1957, 1958. (R. 212.) The plain-
tiff claimed his ''bonuses'' "\vere paid for services (R. 
289), and that the corporation suffered a loss in 1958 
( R. 288). Yet ''bonuses'' were paid to all stockholders 
of the corporation during 1958 (R. 288), and the plain-
tiff, a member of the Board of Directors, claimed ignor-
ance as to a specific formula used to determine the 
amount paid (R. 290). The fact that "bonuses" were 
paid to all stockholders leads to the inescapable conclu-
sion that the "bonuses" were in fact in the nature of 
dividends, and that the value of the stock "\Vas at least 
its par value. 
According to Section 16-2-15, U.C.A. 1953: 
"No corporation shall make or pay any divi-
dend except from the surplus profits arising from 
the business of the corporation and in the cases 
and manner allo,Yed by la"\Y; nor divide, "\Yithdra,Y, 
or in all~~ manner except as provided by la"\Y pay 
to the stockholders or an~y of them, any part of 
the capital of the corporation. * * * '' 
There is a presumption in faYor of legality and 
compliance 'vith the 1a,Y, 31 C.J.S., Evidence, p. 769; 
therefore, it is presumed that Vrontikis Bros., Inc. did 
not Yiolate the la"y in its payments to stockholders in 
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1 ~).->(), 19;>7 and 1958, and that the capital of the corpora-
tion \vas not invaded in making the disbursements to 
the stockholders. 
rrhe ('laimed loss of the corporation in 1958 by 
plaintiff is immaterial. A loss may or may not affect the 
capital structure of the corporation so as to prevent the 
payment of dividends. Surplus may be available for 
payment of dividends even though a loss occurs in a 
given year. This is not to concede that the loss claimed 
is a fact; rather, that even if there were a loss it does 
not follo\\T that the capital is impaired, and the value 
of the stock less than par. 
In vie'v of the foregoing authority and analysis we 
submit the lo,ver court should have found that plaintiff's 
o\\·nership of stock in Vrontikis Bros., Inc. had a value 
of $10,000, "·hich was the par value thereof. 
The court further found that 36,000 shares of Gun-
site Butte Uranium Corporation stock, valued at $1080, 
did not belong to the plaintiff although held in his name 
(R. 1:21). Utah law requires that incorporators and 
directors be stockholders. Sections 16-2-5 and 21, U.C.A. 
1953. Plaintiff \vas one of the organizers (R. 183) and 
directors of the Gunsite Butte Uranium Corporation (R. 
213). Therefore, the Court should have found that the 
plaintiff o\vned the stock held in his name and valued at 
$1,080.00, and committed error in not doing so. On this 
point this Court is requested to take judicial notice of 
the incorporation of the Gunsite Butte Uranium Corpo-
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ration, as filed \vith the Utah Secretary of State. De-
fendant submits that in addition to the property set forth 
above as being owned by plaintiff, the Gunsite stock in 
the Yalue of $1080 should have also been included as 
property of the parties. 
Defendant moved this Court to amend its findings, 
conclusions and decree so that she would be awarded 
$10,000 as her share of the property of the parties. (R. 
96-98.) The motion was based upon the conviction that 
the property of the parties was equal to at least $30,580, 
as set forth above, and that defendant should share in 
at least one-third thereof. Woolley v. Woolley, supra. 
The case of MacDonald r. ll1acDonald (Utah), 236 
P. 2d 1066, is persuasive authority that defendant in 
this case should receive a greater and more equitable 
distribution of property. The ~facDonald decision up-
held a property distribution "'hich awarded the defendant 
\\Tife "much the larger share of the family assets", al-
though the divorce \vas granted the husband. 
In this case, as in ~f acDonald, certain elements \vere 
present for eYaluation. (1) The health of the plaintiff 
Vrontikis is good (R. 196), \Yhile the defendant's physical 
and mental health is poor (R. 69, 1~2, ~60). (2) The 
income of the plaintiff is good, haYing income in the 
years 1956, 1957, and 1958, of $8,185.56, $11,510.57, and 
$7,620.03 respectiYcly (R. 212), and in addition his em-
ployer makes aYailable automobiles, boats, and appli-
ances for his personal use (R. 220, 223) ; the defendant 
has no separate ~ource of income or estate (R. 262). 
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(:)) Plaintiff is a lTniversity graduate (R. 145), cor-
porate prPsideut (H. :211), while the defendant has no 
ppc·ulia r training and limited "\York experience ( R. 270). 
Unlike J/ ac Donald, however, the V rontikis decision 
g-ave the husband the lion's share of the property, despite 
the obvious difficulty of the defendant to provide for 
hPrself. The adjustment of property rights to best serve 
tlH? social needs of the parties involved seems to be the 
tPst set forth in the MacDonald case, wherein the party 
at fault 'vas in greater need of outside assistance. 
Dorothy ~[ae J cnson Vrontikis is suffering from a dis-
ability "·hich impairs her capacity to readjust her life, 
seek gainful employment, and assist in sustaining her-
self. 
Equity inspires that this court modify the findings, 
conclusions and decree of the lower court to award de-
fendant $10,000 as her share of the property settlement, 
for the reason that the total property of the parties 
equals at least $30,580, andjor the reason that the con-
dition and status of the defendant warrant and justify 
an award in that sum. Defendant so moved the lower 
court to amend its findings, conclusions, and decree, and 
the motion "\Yas erroneously denied. The award of the 
lo,ver court is grossly inadequate and an abuse of its 
discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The lo,ver court committed reversible error 111: 
(1) excluding eYidence bearing upon plaintiff's 
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conduct prior to the filing of defendant's counterclaim 
and plaintiff's amended complaint; 
( 2) excluding evidence which bore upon plaintiff's 
coercion of defendant through use of an antenuptial 
agreement of the parties; 
(3) sustaining plaintiff's objections to defendant's 
interrogatories of May 21, 1959. 
A new trial should have been granted by the lower 
court upon motion of the defendant, and was erroneously 
denied. 
The court also erred in awarding plaintiff a divorce 
"rithout evidence of his residence in Salt Lake County 
for three months prior to the action. 
In the event that this Court should conclude there 
is no reversible error, defendant submits that the prop-
erty award should have been modified by the lower court 
in all respects set forth in defendant's motion to amend 
the Court's findings, conclusions and decree; and that 
this Court should so amend and modify the award as set 
forth in Point IV herein. 
Defendant prays further for an a'Yard of a reason-
able attorney's fee for the prosecution of this appeal 
and costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY~fOND \"\T. GEE 
Attorney for Appellant 
366 South State St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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